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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Limitation of Actions Against Architects,
Professional Engineers, and Contractors
In Broome v. TruluckI the South Carolina Supreme Court
held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses
of the South Carolina' and Federa 3 Constitutions a statute4 re-
quiring that actions against architects, professional engineers, or
contractors for the recovery of damages arising from "any defi-
ciency in the design, planning, supervision, observation of con-
struction, construction of, or land surveying in connection with,
an improvement to real property" must be brought within ten
years after substantial completion of such an improvement.!
Relying primarily on a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court,6 the
South Carolina court stated that "architects, engineers, and con-
tractors are singled out for preferential treatment" over owners
and materialmen when "[n]o rational basis appears for making
such a distinction."
7
Historically, architects and engineers enjoyed the protection
of the privity of contract doctrine, which insulated them from
third-party liability.8 This immunity was severely criticized,'
however, and numerous exceptions were created to ameliorate its
1. 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
2. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (1976).
5. Id. The statute provides:
All actions to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning,
supervision, observation of construction, construction of, orland surveying in
connection with, an improvement to real estate, for injury to property, real or
personal, arising out of any such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for
wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation
of construction, construction of, or land surveying in connection with, such
improvement within ten years after substantial completion of such an improve-
ment.
Id.
6. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
7. 270 S.C. at 231, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
8. See Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); Curtain v. Somerset,
140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891).
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 85 (2d ed. 1955). See RESTATEMENT
OF TomS § 385 (1934).
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harsh results.1" Finally, beginning with Inman v. Binghamton
Housing Authority," the privity doctrine was judicially abrogated
and third-party liability was imposed; this new rule of liability
rapidly gained widespread acceptance.12 Consequently, "for ar-
chitects and contractors, the extension of liability was not merely
one of breadth, but also in some instances a significant extension
in duration."" Because a third party's cause of action does not
arise until some injury is suffered, 4 an architect or builder theo-
retically would be liable for an indefinite period after the comple-
tion of his work.'"
In response to this open-ended liability, the American Insti-
tute of Architects, the National Society of Professional Engineers
and the Associated General Contractors began to push for legisla-
tion limiting the duration of liability. 6 "In the span of approxi-
mately two years, 1965-67, thirty jurisdictions enacted or
amended statutes of limitation specifically for architects, engi-
neers, and builders."'" Although the statutes vary somewhat in
coverage and time limitations, the South Carolina statute is rep-
resentative.
Prior to Broome, such statutes had been challenged in nine
jurisdictions, with the decisions split on the constitutional issue.
Arkansas, 8 New Jersey," Oregon,2 Pennsylvania, 21 and Washing-
10. E.g., Bryson v. Hines, 268 F. 290 (4th Cir. 1920) (fraud or intentional conceal-
ment); Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958) (structure constitutes a
nuisance).
11. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964); Brown, Building
Contractor's Liability After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 193
(1967).
13. Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints
for Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. Rav. 361, 361 (1969).
14. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
15. Comment, supra note 13, at 363; Comment, Recent Statutory Developments
Concerning the Limitations of Actions Against Architects, Engineers, and Builders, 60 Ky.
L.J. 462, 464 (1972).
16. Hearings on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678 and H.R. 11544 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967).
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 464.
18. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971).
19. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
20. Josephs v. Bums, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971).
21. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. 441, 341 A.2d 184
(1975).
[Vol. 31
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ton" have upheld similar statutes against equal protection chal-
lenges, while Illinois,"3 Hawaii, 24 Kentucky,2s and Wisconsin"
have declared their statutes unconstitutional. In Skinner v.
Anderson," the Illinois Supreme Court found the classification
arbitrary because "architects and contractors are not the only
persons whose negligence in the construction of a building or
other improvement may cause damage to property or injury to
persons. ' 28 The majority opinion in Broome explicitly adopted
this reasoning.29 This approach, however, disregards "vital
distinction[s] . .. between owners or suppliers and those en-
gaged in the professions and occupations of design and build-
ing.""0 First, because an important consideration underlying stat-
utes of limitation is the problem of proof, "the legislature could
reasonably have concluded that evidentiary problems facing the
architect and contractor are greater than those facing the materi-
almen. ' ' 3' These problems involve both the issues in dispute32 and
the production of evidence on those issues.13 Second, the period
of latency and the professional standards applicable to defects in
design, compared with those applicable to defects in material,
may render architects and engineers more susceptible to stale or
fraudulent claims. 4 "It is a permissible constitutional legislative
function to balance the possibility of outlawing legitimate claims
against the public need that at some definite time there be an end
to potential litigation."3 Third, after completion and acceptance
of the improvement, the owner is in a better position than the
architect to monitor its condition. Moreover, "[p]art of accept-
22. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.
2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
23. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
24. Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973).
25. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. App. 1973).
26. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
27. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
28. Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
29. 270 S.C. at 231-32, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
30. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. at 1176, 455 S.W.2d at 921.
31. Comment, supra note 13, at 371.
32. Id.
33. Vandall, Architects Liability in Georgia: A Special Statute of Limitations, 14 GA.
B.J. 164, 166 (1978); Comment, supra note 15, at 468. These problems include the unavail-
ability of witnesses and the inadequacy of record-keeping procedures.
34. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. at 448, 341 A.2d at
187; Vandall, supra note 33, at 166.
35. Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. at 503, 491 P.2d at 208.
1979]
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ance is to accept some future responsibility for the condition of
the premises."' 6 After completion and acceptance, the architect
no longer has an ongoing connection with the structure, and
"[tihe passage of time increases the likelihood that improper
maintenance, rather than faulty design or construction, is the
proximate cause of injury. '3 Last, as previously indicated, "the
class of persons for whose benefit this law was enacted has be-
come subject to an extension of potential liability" 38 that has not
been imposed on owners and materialmen. Clearly, a number of
legitimate differences exist between the class of architects and
engineers on one hand, and that of owners and materialmen on
the other.
Even if these differences were less than substantial, the stat-
ute could have been upheld by a number of constructional de-
vices. This approach would seem to be dictated by the fundamen-
tal preference for constitutional interpretations in statutory con-
struction.39 For example, in Carter v. Hartenstein,0 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas noted that some materialmen may fall within
the purview of the statute if they perform any design function."
The Supreme Court of Washington went even further,42 holding
that the Washington statute was "not limited as to vocation"43
because it did not expressly mention particular occupational sta-
tuses." A similar approach would have been available in South
Carolina, where the statutory protection was directed to "any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervi-
sion, observation of construction, construction of, or land survey-
ing in connection with . . . an improvement [to real property]
.. ..- An expansive interpretation of this language would not
be limited to architects, engineers, and contractors and could
conceivably include materialmen, particularly if the components
they furnish involve any aspect of design or construction. By
interpreting the statute to remove the class distinctions, a court
36. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. at 1175, 455 S.W.2d at 920.
37. Vandall, supra note 33, at 166. See also Comment, supra note 15, at 468.
38. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. at 201, 293 A.2d at 667.
39. E.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1970).
40. 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U. S. 901 (1971).
41. Id. at 1175, 455 S.W.2d at 920.
42. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.
2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
43. Id. at 532, 503 P.2d at 111.
44. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.300 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (1976) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 31
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
could obviate the equal protection challenge.
Perhaps more important, the equal protection clause
"permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws
which affect some groups of citizens differently from others."' "
Courts generally will afford deference to any legislatively per-
ceived distinction. The classification must neither be purely arbi-
trary" nor rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective,"4 but these are not stringent standards.
Furthermore, "[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that in practice
their laws result in some inequity. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."'" The previously enumerated differences between
the class of architects, engineers and contractors, and class of
owners and materialmen would seem to provide the legislature
with a sufficient basis to draw a distinction between the protec-
tion afforded to these classes.
The standards and presumptions normally utilized by the
supreme court in approaching equal protection problems are cu-
riously absent in Broome. Justice Littlejohn's dissent, adopting
the well-researched order of Judge Coleman,5° advanced the appl-
icable standards and discussed other jurisdictions' resolution of
the constitutional issue. Unfortunately, the laudatory motive of
providing a remedy for the injury suffered by this particular
plaintiff resulted in the adoption of an approach inconsistent with
other recent equal protection pronouncements of the court.
B. Blue Laws
In State v. Smith, ' the supreme court again 52 upheld the
constitutionality of South Carolina blue laws against an equal
protection challenge. South Carolina Code section 53-1-40 pro-
vides in part:
46. State v. Smith, 271 S.C. 317, 320, 247 S.E.2d 331, 332 (1978).
47. Hunt v. McNair, 255 S.C. 71, 177 S.E.2d 362 (1970).
48. State v. Solomon, 245 S.C. 550, 572, 141 S.E.2d 818, 830 (1965).
49. State v. Smith, 271 S.C. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332 (1978); State v. Solomon, 245
S.C. at 572, 141 S.E.2d at 830.
50. 270 S.C. at 233-38, 241 S.E.2d at 741-44.
51. 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978).
52. See State v. Solomon, 245 S.C. 550, 141 S.E.2d 818 (1965).
1979]
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On the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, it shall
be unlawful for any person to engage in worldly work, labor,
business of his ordinary calling or the selling or offering to sells
publicly or privately or by telephone, at retail or at wholesale
to the consumer any goods, wares, or merchandise or to employ
others to engage in work, labor, business or selling or offering to
sell any goods, wares or merchandise, excepting work of neces-
sity or charity. 3
Plaintiff specifically challenged the exception to this provision
contained in section 53-1-50 of the code, which states in pertinent
part: "Section 53-1-40 shall not apply to. . .grocery stores which
do not employ more than three persons including the owners or
proprietors at any one time. . . -51 Observing that the purpose
of the statute was "to provide a uniform day of rest for all citi-
zens," 55 the court emphasized that the legislature is permitted
much discretion in delineating classifications and concluded that
"[b]y limiting the workers to three, the statute insures that the
day of rest is extended to the maximum number of citizens, while
at the same time making necessary food items available.""' In a
strong dissent, Justice Ness stated that the statute "blatantly
discriminates against larger grocery stores in favor of smaller ones
: . . [and] therefore has the effect of treating persons engaged
in the same business differently."57
Although constitutional challenges to Sunday closing laws
date back at least to the 19th century,58 the statutes have histori-
cally withstood such challenges. The modern view, advanced by
the United States Supreme Court in a quartet of cases decided
in 1961, ' 1 has generally upheld blue laws against both establish-
ment of religion and equal protection claims, although successful
challenges on those grounds have not been totally precluded.'"
Nonetheless, some courts have recognized that the laws are held
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-40 (1976).
54. Id. § 53-1-50.
55. 271 S.C. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting State v. Solomon, 245 S.C. at 566,
141 S.E.2d at 827).
56. 271 S.C. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332.
57. Id. at 322, 247 S.E.2d at 333 (Ness, J., dissenting).
58. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885).
59. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
60. See 366 U.S. at 425 (1961).
[Vol. 31
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in "popular disdain,"'" and fifteen states have repealed their Sun-
day restrictions.12 Moreover, in addition to this legislative abroga-
tion of blue laws, a number of state courts have struck down blue
laws on equal protection grounds. 3
Most of the challenged exceptions to Sunday closing laws
have been "commodity" exceptions, based on the nature of the
business and the character of the merchandise sold;6" however, a
few courts have adjudicated the constitutionality of "employee
limitation" exceptions. The recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Alabama in Piggly-Wiggly of Jacksonville, Inc. v. City of
Jacksonville,5 cited by the dissent, is directly on point. In holding
an employee limitation exception unconsitutional, the court
stated:
All food stores, regardless of size, should find their Sunday oper-
ation governed by the legislative purpose of protection of health
and welfare, and therefore should be included in the same class.
The classification chosen by the legislature, four regular em-
ployees, seems to us to be an arbitrary classification for which
no relation to purpose has ever been provided."
Courts that have upheld the constitutionality of such excep-
tions have generally pointed to the "traffic, noise and activity"6
associated with larger establishments; however, this does not di-
rectly relate to the general legislative purpose of providing a uni-
form day of rest. Furthermore, other activities that produce noise
and traffic, such as amusement parks,6" sporting events sponsored
by colleges or universities, 9 machine shops,70 and manufacturing
61. Peysle v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 285-86, 353 N.E.2d 574, 579, 386 N.Y.S.2d
661, 666 (1976).
62. Note, Sunday Closing Laws in the United States: An Unconstitutional
Anachronism, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1089, 1090-91 n.7 (1977).
63. E.g., Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v.
Village of South Holland, 18 Ill. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1960); Skag-Way Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966); Two Guys v. Furman, 32 N.J.
199, 160 A.2d 265 (1960); People v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.S. 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1976).
64. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R. 975 (1958).
65. 336 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1976).
66. Id. at 1081.
67. 271 S.C. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332. See also Opinion of the Justices, 159 Me. 410,
191 A.2d 637 (1963); Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d
197 (1967).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-30 (1976).
69. Id. § 53-1-20.
70. Id. § 53-1-100.
1979]
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plants requiring continuous operation 7 are excluded from the
prohibition of section 53-1-40. As previously stated, a concomi-
tant justification advanced by the supreme court is to extend
"the day of rest . . . to the maximum number of citizens. '7 2 If
the rationale is "to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens, "'
a distinction based on greater or lesser degrees of "uniformity"
seems somewhat specious. Other statutory exceptions appear
unconcerned with the number of persons affected.74 Indeed, the
operation of a few large grocery stores could provide necessary
items to the public by employing fewer total employees than
required for the operation of many smaller stores. As the Supreme
Court of Nebraska observed in Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood,
'75
[s]o far as the general public is concerned, there will be no
change in buying habits, merely a little inconvenience. The pub-
lic may still shop on Sunday. It can still buy the same articles
it has always bought on that day. The only difference is that in
some instances it will be necessary to trade at different estab-
lishments than those patronized in the past. How this can pro-
mote the declared purpose of [the statute] is in the realm of
speculative conjecture. We are unable to perceive how it can
possibly be promotive of the health and welfare of the people of
the state . . . to prohibit the operation of retail outlets having
more than two employees from Sunday activity while permit-
ting those with two employees to operate .... 71
Although the question presented by State v. Smith is a close
one and the position taken by the court is defensible, it is interest-
ing to note that the court emphasized the discretion afforded the
legislature in constructing classifications in Smith while avoiding
such emphasis in other recent equal protection cases. Whether
this emphasis precedes or follows the court's appraisal of the
merits of the case is unclear. In any case, the continuing contro-
versy surrounding South Carolina's blue laws suggests that some
action, whether legislative or judicial, should be forthcoming.
71. Id. § 53-1-130.
72. 271 S.C. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332.
73. 245 S.C. at 566, 141 S.E.2d at 827 (emphasis added).
74. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-10 to -140 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
75. 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
76. Id. at 525, 129 N.W.2d at 481.
77. See Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Marley v. Kirby,
271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
[Vol. 31
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C. Comparative Negligence
In Marley v. Kirby7 8 the supreme court invalidated on equal
protection grounds the portion of the South Carolina Automobile
Reparation Reform Act of 197471 that applied comparative negli-
gence principles to motor vehicle accidents. 0 Although recogniz-
ing "the validity of comparative negligence statutes of general
application,"8 the court relied on a 1965 decision of the Florida
Supreme Court, Georgia Southern & Florida Railway v. Seven-
Up Bottling Co.,82 to conclude that "a comparative negligence
statute applying only to a limited class of defendants is unconsti-
tutional." ' Employing a strict equal protection approach similar
to that in Broome v. Truluck,84 the court held that there was "no
rational basis for separating injuries from motor vehicle accidents
from injuries from other torts." '
Since the nineteenth century, statutes have provided for the
apportionment of damages86 in limited classes of cases according
"to the type of accident or the grouping of persons and goods"
8
affected. The most influential early comparative negligence stat-
ute of limited application was the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,u passed in 1908,11 which was restricted in operation to rail-
road employees engaged in interstate commerce; the statute "set
off a flood of labor legislation of the same general kind."" Similar
provisions were incorporated in the Jones9 and Death on the High
78. 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-300, 56-11-10 to -800 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976). The section provides as follows:
In any motor vehicle accident, contributory negligence shall not bar recov-
ery in any action by any person or legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such contribu-
tory negligence was equal to or less than the negligence which must be estab-
lished in order to recover from the party against whom recovery is sought.
Id.
81. 271 S.C. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
82. 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
83. 271 S.C. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
84. 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
85. 271 S.C. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
86. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 2979 (1860-62).
87. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (pt. 2), 28 Cm.-KEMr L. REv. 304,
335 (1950).
88. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
89. 35 Stat. 66 (1908).
90. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. Rnv. 465, 478 (1953).
91. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
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Seas92 Acts, applying to maritime employees. 3 Additionally,
[tihe provision was repeated in substance in a series of state
"employers' liability acts," covering railroad employees engaged
in intrastate commerce, which were adopted in Colorado, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
and Wyoming. Broader statutes of the same kind were made
applicable to employees engaged in certain specified occupa-
tions, usually hazardous, such as mining or lumbering, in Ari-
zona, Florida, Iowa, and Oregon, and to all employees of intras-
tate corporations in Arkansas. . . . In Florida and Iowa the
provision was made applicable to any injury inflicted by a rail-
road. In Virginia it has been applied to accidents at crossings
arising out of the railroad's failure to give the required sig-
nals. .... 11
Thus, most comparative negligence statutes are not general in
operation, but are restricted in application according to classifi-
cations based on the nature of the injury, the cause of the acci-
dent, or the characteristics of the persons or property affected.
2 5
"There are altogether some thirty special statutes on the books,
applicable to particular classes of plaintiffs or defendants, or to
particular situations. . ... "1 Of these statutes, only one has
been held to violate the principle of equal protection." The South
Carolina Supreme Court chose to predicate Marley on that single
instance.
Georgia Southern & Florida Railway v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co. is not only atypical, but a careful review of the decision re-
veals that the South Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on it may
be somewhat misplaced. Although the case invalidated on equal
protection grounds a comparative negligence statute that applied
only to railroad accidents, the irrationality of the classification
was not a result of the limited application of the statute per se,
but rather stemmed from "changes in the conditions to which it
92. Id. § 766 (1976).
93. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (Jones Act); 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (Death on the High Seas
Act).
94. Prosser, supra note 90, at 478-80.
95. Turk, supra note 87, at 335-37.
96. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 at 436 (4th ed. 1971).
97. Georgia Southern & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
See also Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541 (1912); Mondou v. New York, N.H. &
H. Ry., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133 (1898); Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 So. 719 (1931).
[Vol. 31
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applie[d]."" Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged
that the statute had been "valid when enacted." 9 Its constitu-
.tionality previously had been upheld against an equal protection
challenge. 00 Its defect was merely the result of changed circum-
stances. When the statute was passed, "some ten years before the
first patent was issued in this country for a gasoline-driven auto-
mobile,"'' it was "predicated upon a classification having sub-
stantial basis in the dangers incident to the operation of railroad
trains."'0 2 As Professor Turk has observed, it was the hazards
associated with the railroad industry "that did the most to stimu-
late the growth of the statutory comparative negligence doctrine
in this country.' 0 3 The development of the automobile, however,
introduced another "peculiarly dangerous"'0 4 instrumentality,
comparable to railroads.'0 ' Thus, depite its limited application,
the comparative negligence statute was valid when enacted, but
became "a discriminatory and burdensome exercise of the police
power because of changed conditions . . ... -" Clearly, Georgia
Southern stands not only for the proposition that a compartive
negligence statute of limited application may violate the guaran-
tee of equal protection, but also for the proposition that such a
statute may survive constitutional scrutiny.
Thus, the relevant case law does not support the contention
that a comparative negligence statute of limited application is
per se violative of equal protection. The court's assertion to the
contrary"' is belied by Boyleston v. Southern Ry. ,'18 which held
that while "[o]rdinarily, the doctrine of comparative negligence
is not recognized in this state,""' "[t]his general rule is subject
to the exception that the doctrine of comparative negligence ex-
ists by statute in this state in the matter of railroad employers'
liability.""10 Comparative negligence statutes of limited applica-
98. 175 So. 2d at 40.
99. Id.
100. Loftin v. Crowley's, Inc., 150 Fla. 836, 8 So. 2d 909 (1942).
101. 175 So. 2d at 41.
102. Grace v. Geneva Lumber Co., 71 Fla. 31, 34, 70 So. 774, 775 (1916).
103. Turk, supra note 87, at 334.
104. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 445, 86 So. 629, 631 (1920).
105. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244 (1941).
106. Georgia Southern & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d at 42.
107. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
108. 211 S.C. 232, 44 S.E.2d 537 (1947).
109. Id. at 238, 44 S.E.2d at 539.
110. Id. This statute presently remains in force. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-17-3730 (1976).
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tion are only invalid, therefore, if the classification scheme em-
ployed is "purely arbitrary.""'
The court stated in Marley that it could not "perceive the
rational justification for singling out persons injured in automo-
bile accidents as different from all others injured in negligent
torts";"2 however, a number of distinctions could be hypothes-
ized. Automobiles have been held to be dangerous instrumental-
ities,"'3 which would seem to distinguish automobile accidents
from many other torts. Moreover, motor vehicles are governed by
special insurance"' and licensing and registration 5 regulations,
as well as automobile guest statutes."6 The mere fact that auto-
mobiles provide such a constant and profuse source of accidents
should allow the legislature to distinguish them from other less
significant sources. As in Broome v. Truluck, the wide scope of
discretion and presumption of constitutionality normally af-
forded the legislature"7 are conspicuously absent, and that ab-
sence is crucial to the outcome of the constitutional challenge.
D. Conclusion
The recent equal protection cases appear to be irreconcilable.
The supreme court's dispositions of the constitutional claims in
Broome v. Truluck, State v. Smith, and Marley v. Kirby, while
each defensible in itself, are marred by the inconsistency of stan-
dards employed in the analyses. The standards applicable to the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection have become little
more than incantations, ritualistically preceding the court's de-
termination of the merits of a particular case. Until the court
advances a more uniform approach, only uncertainty and incon-
sistency can result, with inconclusive decisions stimulating more
litigation. The importance of this constitutional protection de-
mands a more thoughtful approach.
111. Hunt v. McNair, 255 S.C. 71, 83, 177 S.E.2d 362, 368 (1970).
112. 271 S.C. at 125, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
113. E.g., Stovall v. Sawyer, 181 S.C. 379, 187 S.E. 821 (1936); Heslep v. State
Highway Dept., 171 S.C. 186, 171 S.E. 913 (1933).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-37-10 to -1510 (1976 & Gum. Supp. 1978).
115. Id. §§ 56-3-10 to -2520.
116. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976).
117. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
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II. MAGISTRATES' COURTS
The constitutionality of several aspects of South Carolina's
magisterial court system was tested in a group of cases consoli-
dated for review in State ex rel McLeod v. Crowe. 1 8 Nine of the
cases were brought in the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act!" by
the attorney general "in order to determine the constitutionality
of a number of statutes enacted by the South Carolina General
Assembly both before and after April 4, 1973, the effective date
of new Article V of the South Carolina Constitution"; 2 " the re-
maining case, although brought by private parties, presented
"identical"1 2' questions. The "pivotal issues"' 22 in all of the ac-
tions, as enumerated in the court's per curiam opinion, were: "(1)
whether magisterial courts are included in this State's uniform
judicial system; (2) whether legislation establishing varying terri-
torial jurisdictions is unconstitutional; (3) whether fees charged
in magisterial courts must be uniform; and (4) whether judicial
officers may accept fees derived from their performance of judi-
cial acts."'2 The court's resolution of these issues has had an
immediate and pervasive effect on the state's judicial system,
and in this respect the decision is one of the most significant of
1978. The issues of territorial and administrative uniformity of
both the magistrates' courts and the so-called "check clearing
houses" and the issue of magistrates' pecuniary interest in the
disposition of civil cases shall be treated separately.
A. Unified Judicial System
In 1972, the judiciary article of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion was extensively revised, and a "unified judicial system"' 24
was created. Section 1 of article V provides: "The judicial power
shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include
a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uni-
form jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."'' 2 Mag-
118. 272 S.C. 41, 249 S.E.2d 772 (1978).
119. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
120. Brief of Plaintiff at 5, State ex rel. McLeod v. Crowe, 272 S.C. 41, 249 S.E.2d
772 (1978).
121. 272 S.C. at 53, 249 S.E.2d at 778.
122. Id. at 46, 249 S.E.2d at 775.
123. Id.
124. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1.
125. Id.
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isterial courts are specifically included within this system by arti-
cle V, section 23.126 Reading the two provisions together, the court
held that "it clearly appears . . magisterial courts are vested
with judicial power and are, therefore, a part of the State's uni-
form judicial system."' Hence, magistrates' courts must con-
form to the uniformity requirements set out in sections 1 and 2328
of article V.
In a previous interpretation of these constitutional provi-
sions, the court had stated that "[t]he people in approving arti-
cle V mandated a uniform system of courts for the administration
of justice in South Carolina."'' 29 Furthermore, in State ex rel
McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County, " the court
held that "Article V, Section 1, directs that a unified and uniform
judicial system be created; and any alteration or extension of the
present system, other than as so mandated, is unconstitu-
tional."'"' Historically, the magisterial court system in South
Carolina has developed rather haphazardly through a gradual
process of accretion,'3 2 with numerous and sometimes conflicting
legislative enactments creating a "crazy quilt pattern of terri-
torial jurisdiction . . ."I"
For example, in some counties magistrates have countywide ju-
risdiction; in other counties magistrates have jurisdiction in
magisterial districts which are less than countywide in territory;
others have magistrates with countywide civil jurisdiction and
district wide criminal jurisdiction; while another has a magis-
trate who has exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction within his
district and at the same time concurrent jurisdiction throughout
the county.'3
126. The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
appoint a number of magistrates for each county as provided by law. The Gen-
eral Assembly shall provide for their terms of office and their civil and criminal
jurisdiction. The terms of office need not be uniform throughout the State but
shall be uniform within each county.
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 23.
127. 272 S.C. at 46, 249 S.E.2d at 775.
128. Application of the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius suggests that article V, § 23 requires statewide uniformity of all aspects of magis-
trates' courts except term of office. See Brief of Plaintiff at 17-18.
129. Cort Indus. Corp. v. Swirl, Inc., 264 S.C. 142, 145, 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975).
130. 265 S.C. 114, 217 S.E.2d 23 (1975).
131. Id. at 11.6, 217 S.E.2d at 24.
132. Brief of Plaintiff at 35 n.23, State ex rel McLeod v. Crowe, 272 S.C. 41, 249
S.E.2d 772 (1978).
133. Id. at 31.
134. 272 S.C. at 47, 249 S.E.2d at 776.
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Clearly, "[u]nder the present statutes the territorial jurisdiction
of magistrates varies in many instances among the counties and
between magistrates within the same county.""' Magistrates'
courts must conform to the constitutional requirements of uni-
formity, and in Crowe the court held unequivocally that "[s]uch
uniformity can only be accomplished through legislation which
grants all magistrates uniform countywide jurisdiction.' ' 36 Thus,
the court's decision renders constitutionally defective any legisla-
tion that provides for magisterial jurisdiction of other than coun-
tywide extent, thereby lacking uniformity within a county, or
that provides for magisterial jurisdiction varying in statewide
application, thereby lacking uniformity between counties.
The court also considered the question of administrative uni-
formity and the relation of magisterial fee schedules to the consti-
tutional mandates of sections 1 and 23 of article V. In attacking
the validity of Act 1245 of 1970 and Act 172 of 1973, which created
special fee schedules applicable to Greenwood and Lexington
counties, the attorney general had argued that the legislation was
constitutionally proscribed by both the requirements of uniform-
ity in article V and the prohibition of special legislation in article
Ill, section 34, subdivision IX. The court, however, explicitly re-
fused to reach the latter issue,'3 7 concluding that "[1]egislation
establishing disparate fee schedules for magistrate courts over the
state conflicts with the uniformity requirements of article V."' '3
The court reasoned that
[s]ection 23 of article V, interpreted in conjunction with sec-
tion 1 of that Article, empowers the General Assembly to pro-
vide for the jurisdiction of magistrates in a uniform manner
only. The exercise of such jurisdiction is materially affected by
the fees allowed to be charged or assessed. Since the fees for
magistrate courts affect the exercise of jurisdiction, they must
be enacted on a uniform basis.'
3'
Special fee schedules, therefore, are inconsistent with the dictates
of sections 1 and 23 of article V, and cannot withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. Accordingly, the court specifically invalidated
both of the contested enactments.
135. Id. at 47, 249 S.E.2d at 775.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 53, 249 S.E.2d at 779.
138. Id. at 47, 249 S.E.2d at 776.
139. Id. at 47-48, 249 S.E.2d at 776.
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B. Pecuniary Interest of Magistrates
in Litigation
The final issue addressed by the court in Crowe was the
constitutionality of fee compensation systems for magistrates in
civil litigation. The state's challenges to South Carolina Code
sections 27-437,11 empowering Pickens County magistrates to re-
tain fees as compensation in certain civil proceedings, and 27-
422,111 permitting "magistrates in certain counties to collect fees
from defendants whose prosecutions for violation of the fraudu-
lent check statute. . . are discontinued by settlement or compro-
mise,"'' were "based on the theory that such pecuniary interest
deprives the litigants of due process of law."'' 4 The court held that
"[tlo the degree such statutes vest judicial officers with a pecu-
niary interest in the proceedings before them, they violate Article
I, Section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution and are likewise
impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.'
The proscription of judicial officers' pecuniary interest in
criminal prosecutions is well established. In South Carolina,
magistrates are statutorily precluded from receiving fees in crimi-
nal cases by code sections 22-7-30 and 22-7-40. Moreover, federal
case law prohibits on due process grounds any judge from becom-
ing financially interested, either directly45 or indirectly,' 46 in the
outcome of a criminal action before him. The constitutional stan-
dard enunciated by Justice Brennan in Ward v. Monroeville,'47
and specifically adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court
in Crowe, focuses on "[w]hether the . . . situation is one 'which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,
or which might lead him to not hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused.' "14" This standard is
based on "[t]he potential for deprivation of due process";' the
140. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-437 (1962).
141. Id. § 27-422
142. 272 S.C. 41, 52, 249 S.E.2d 772, 776.
143. Id. at 48, 249 S.E.2d at 776.
144. Id. at 49, 249 S.E.2d at 776-77.
145. Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
146. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
147. Id.
148. 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
149. 272 S.C. at 48, 249 S.E.2d at 776 (emphasis added).
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court emphasized that its conclusion was "not predicated upon
an actual showing of abuse by . . . [the] magistrates."' 5
In extending this constitutional principle to civil litigation
the court relied primarily on two recent decisions of the West
Virginia Supreme Court. 5' According to State ex rel Shrewsbury
v. Poteet,z "[i]t is essential to the fair and proper administra-
tion of justice that courts, whether the highest in the land or the
most minor, be completely independent, absolutely free from in-
fluence and wholly without any pecuniary interest, however re-
mote, in any matter before them." 113 The rationale for this pros-
cription in civil matters, as expressed by one commentator, is
that
[i]n order to encourage complainants to institute actions in his
court, and to discourage them from forum shopping to find an-
other judicial officer more sympathetic to complaining parties,
a [magistrate] may feel compelled to please the people who
bring cases to his court. Since in civil cases the plaintiff is
pleased only when he wins, judicial bias may be created in favor
of plaintiffs. The potential for judicial bias may be strongest
when the complaining party, such as a large creditor, can create
a considerable volume of judicial business. 154
Stating that "the potential for deprivation of due process also
exists in civil matters where judicial officers possess a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of litigation,"'' 5 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court struck down the challenged statute.
C. Conclusion
The "hodge podge of local laws"'56 establishing magistrates'
courts, with its conflicting and inconsistent provisions, is in un-
mistakable disharmony with the dictates of the South Carolina
Constitution. This disharmony is emphasized by the magisterial
courts' position as the most numerous and perhaps most visible
150. Id. at 52, 249 S.E.2d at 778.
151. State ex rel Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974); State ex rel
Reece v. Gies, 156 W. Va. 729, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973).
152. 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974).
153. Id. at 631.
154. Note, The Fee System Courts: Financial Interest of Judges and Due Process, 31
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 474, 483 (1974).
155. 272 S.C. at 48, 249 S.E.2d at 776.
156. Brief of Plaintiff at 35, State ex rel McLeod v. Crowe, 272 S.C. 41, 249 S.E.2d
772 (1978).
1979]
17
Rogers: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1979
38 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
subdivision of the state's judicial system. The supreme court's
sweeping pronouncements in Crowe should largely eliminate the
"current balkanization of our [judicial] system.' 51 7 The magis-
terial court system envisioned by the court, uniform and finan-
cially detached, presents an appealing and commendable goal; it
now remains for the General Assembly to effectuate this goal.
Thomas DeWitt Rogers, Ill
157. Cort Indus. Corp. v. Swirl, Inc., 264 S.C. 192, 196, 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975).
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